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Mainstream scholarship views the Iranian revolution as an outcome of an ideological process, (he culmination ot a long-lasting Islamic movement which had been evolving since the late 1960s Hamid Dabashi's impressivework seems to suggest that in (his "deeply religious society." the Islamists spent a long time preparing for an Islamic takeover Through the institutions ol mosque. lmw:cli (theological seminary) sermons, preaching, and publications, they were husv will) recruiting, organi/ing. training, and mohili/ing their resources so that (hey could gain power when internai and international opportunities presented themselves.' Similarly, for Mansoor Moaddel. the I si n mill like In ai knowledge l IK-Mai Aulmi I oiind.il ion. the l'iopiam mi I V.u. c ami I nlcni.il u nul l oopcr.ilion loc supporting .1 bioad project on yiassroots lonsiilnriu ) ol Islainu aUiwsm in h.in .mil I s'y pi ol whic.li this essa) is ,i p.nt My ih.inks arc also lo I'rolcssors Saad I Mm llnahiiii I icil Hallulay. I rvancl Ahiahamian Sann /ubaiil.i. .nul Aiinanilo SaKaloic as well as the .inoiiMiions u-Mcwcrs ol llns |ociinal who rc.nl anil lommcnlcil on c.iilici versions ol Ihis essay None ol them are responsible toi lia lomlusmns drawn in this essay 1 In I U 7X Ihr pei lapila UK ome in li.m was $2.400. eoinpaied lo SdoO in l'(:y|)l in 1 U XX During the I')7(K. some 15 pen cut ol Irhran's population lived in the squatter areas (and about 15 percent in slums), wheieas llns tifiurc loi (ami in the early I'WOs was 50 percent.
Maiiinl D.ii'.isin. lh<t>lo^\ i>i DIM unit in The Ideological Foundation iif the Islumu K/\nlu nun in linn (New York New Yoik I ni\risii\ I'icss I')VS| I III |-oi instaiue Saul A Ai|oin.uul statesthal in I'Xil 7X the u-hfiious inslilntions came under relentless atlack by the Pahl,is i siale and had to murt the masses more assiduously m older lo mobili/c them in Us defense see (K)l04l7V>)X/|5)e 05 1 MS'J 50 > IWX Souci) loi ( onipaialiu-Sind) ol SIK ICH and HlMoi) firth'** emergence of the "Islamic discourse" in the particular "episode" of 1953-77 culminated in the Islamic revolution.
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Although Moaddel and Dabashi focus on internal factors, others such as Anthony Parsons and Nikkie Keddie regard the Islamic revival as the popular assertion of "Muslim identity" against Western political and cultural penetration. Parsons argues that the Iranian revolution was different from other revolutions in that the "bulk of the Shi'i population of Iran knew both what they did not want (the continuation of Pahlavi rule) and what they did want (a government controlled by religious leadership, the historical guardians of the Islamic Iranian tradition)." For Keddie, two additional factors played a role: a growing association between secularism and western control and a government associated with the western powers. 4 Others have explained the revolution in terms of the breakdown of the traditional social order caused by "social dislocation and normative disturbance." Said Amir Arjomand views this as the result of the socioeconomic changes that the state initiated. Unable to integrate the dislocated and disoriented groups into its own structure, the state pushed them to the arms of the Shi'i clergy, who were ready to mobilize them since the 1960s. The Islamic movement acted as the "rival integrative movement," offering the disoriented with a sense of moral and spiritual community. 5 What happened in 1979, according to Arjomand "was destined to be an Islamic revolution with the goal of establishing a theocracy.' >f> Structural factors and class interests are emphasized by yet another group of scholars. Ervand Abrahamian, Fred Halliday, Mohsen Milani, and Keddie (in her later writings) among others consider the contradiction between socioeconomic development and political autocracy as the main source of conflict and the social classes ;is major players in the revolution. 7 Patsa Misaq in addition places special emphasis on the role of the state-the high degree of I }S ASM MAYA I state iniei \i-iition in capital accumulation eroded the mediating role of the market, rendering the slate the target ol all conflict and opposition. s I do not intend to offer a thorough assessment of each o! these explanations Undoubtedly, these authors have on the whole shed a valuable light on the complexities ot the Iranian revolution I do propose here to point to two problems. 1-irst. despite their differences, these authors grant an overestimated agency to a supposed strong Islamic movement which is said to have evolved since the 1960s or earlier, and to its role in carrying the revolution to victory. fins is an assumption which I shall question m this essay Second, the pro posed models, in general, may be able (o explain nol the revolution per se but help to identity (he major causes behind popular resentment and mobili/ation One still needs to examine how a massive mobili/alion and movement articulates into a revolution. Indeed, as Henry Munson argues, most of the factors suggested by the above authors -resentment of foreign domination, authoritarian rule. Moladon ol traditional values, social dislocation, economic downturn. inequality, and state intervention also existed m some other Middle I -.astern countries but did not mutcriali/e into revolution.
1 ' for Hgypt. Snow and Marsh, il maintain cultural imperialism and globalization as the underlying cause ot (he Islamist mo\emenl '" Similarly. Bmgat and Dowel I see Islamism in Egypt and in North Africa as the third phase ot anti-colonialism -cultural and discursive independence -alter jiolitic.il and economic independence. 
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None of the major models of collective action has theori/eti the dynamics of the transformation from collective action to revolution. They are concerned largely with explaining causes of social discontent and revolutionary crisis.
1 < For James Davies. "Revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal."
14 As in Ciurr's "relative deprivation" thesis, what seems to mediate between these objective processes and the occurrence of revolution is the psychological mood of the people, their expectations, and frustrations.
|S But as the resource mobili/ation theorists have pointed out. the mood of a people may not lead to action unless they are able to mobili/e the necessary resources by creating appropriate opportunities. In this context. Tilly's important concepts-<>pponniin\. or those factors which facilitate collective action, and s///>/ws.s;V>/i, or those which restrict it are particularly useful."' And so are the degree of the legitimacy of the authorities, the dynamics of the use ol violence, and the division within the elites which Quee-Young Kim highlighted. 17 Yet these theorists fail to capture the complex dynamics of the interaction hel ween (he contenders and state during the revolutionary process.
Popular discontents, whatever their cause, may give rise to two types ol mohili/ation. The first type, protest or insurrectionary movements, like Iran's revolutionary movement during l l )7S. aims solely to negate the existing order: l hey may or may not be able to build an alternative structure. The second, social movements, aim to alter the dominant arrangements but also attempt to establish alternative institutions and value systems before a total change. The I ; .uropean Socialist movements. Poland's Solidarity, and some Islamist movements, represeni such a pattern. In general, such social movements are more or less structured and require the durable efforts of a relatively large number of people to produce social change. These movements may be composed of diverse activities with pervasive institutional ramifications within civil society. As constituents ol alternative institutions and cultural settings, they differ from such free-form collective actions as riots or street demonstrations or from rigidly structured interest groups which concern only their own members. Social movements are also different from power seeking political parlies, small cliques like secret discussion groups, and underground guerrilla organi/ations without mass support. Yet they may be connected to these kinds of activities, share many features with them, or even transform into one another (such as the Rifah Party or the Islamic movement in Turkey'.'). They are, moreover, distinct from revolutions, in thai the latter refers to processes of pervasive, usually violent and rapid change, where the political authority cnllapses and is replaced by the contenders."* Protest movements which may culminate in insurrections, on the other hand, are usually transitory and do not last long. Either they achieve their goal or get suppressed. The most critical element for protest movements is sustamability. since they directly challenge the political authority. Nevertheless, in some rare cases, a protest movement may transform itself into a more structured and institutionali/ed social movement or even into an interest group. Jadwiga Stams/kis has referred to Solidarity's transformation during September 1980 and March 1981 from a national movement into a trade union position as "Poland's sell-limiting revolution."
1 '' Solidarity regained its original status after the crackdown by the military regime in 1981 and reemerged in the late 1980s after the "Gorbachev revolution." 20 Because they are institutionali/ed within the civil society, social movementsunlike protest actions and insurrections-are able to sustain and persist longer when confronted with the state. However, precisely because of this dynamics, they are likely to turn away from a revolutionary or insurrectionary character by struggling, instead, within an existing arrangement. Many factors contribute to this. The first has to do with the temporal clement Unlike an insurrectionary movement which docs not have much time (because it either crushes or gets crushed), social movements function within a longer span of time, during which people can ask questions, debate key issues, and be clear about the aims of the movement. Various ideas and consequently divergent tendencies develop. While clarity and differentiation mark the salient features of a social movement, ambiguity and unity arc the hallmarks of insurrectionary actions Second, because of the positive changes that they may generate, social movements may modify the conditions of their own existence For instance, the unemployed movement in Iran in 1979 undermined itself partly because it achieved some of its goals.
21 Unlike the protest movements or insurrections which only negate the prevailing order, social movements tend '" More precisely, a revolution is. in Huntington's \vords. "a rapid, fundamental, and violent domesliL (.hange in Ihc di un in,ml \ allies and myths ot I aocicty, in itf political institutions, social structure, leadership, and government actmty .nul politus" See S Huntington. "Modernization and Revolution, in Claude. I'. Welch and M B. Tainlor. eds.. Kctnliiiinii ami I'nliliinl ('luuix? (1972 i'.lso to construct alternative institutions and value systems. In this process, they develop, for instance, alternative credit systems for the poor as well as clinics, factories, mutual aid, housing, and systems of social protection, all of which may lulfill some of the needs of their constituencies. Besides, they also give rise to social and cultural sub-systems which usually coexist, albeit with tension, within the dominant order. Alternative electoral systems in autonomous unions, syndicates, neighborhoods and associations for the excluded groups are a few of their institutional manifestations. Finally, alternative religious and cultural organizations-schools, holidays, charities, political parties as well as those dealing with music, art. customs, and even laws -are set up to serve as a moral community in which excluded people can feel al home. The Austrian socialist movement in the 1420s and Egyptian Islamic activism represent two examples.
Some neo-Durkheimian social theorists, such as Arjomand. view such institutions as the embodiment of an "integralivc community" which breeds opposition to dominant institutions and value systems (as in Iran). However, instead of political opposition, such arrangements are likely to lead to what (iucnther Roth (in an analysis ol Social Democracy m Imperial Germany) calls "negative integration" -partial economic and political inclusion combined with alternative cultural and social existence. 22 On the other hand. integration theorists such as Kendix and upset (pointing to the Western European trade union movement) have argued that institutionali/ation of this nature helps contenders develop interests in the prevailing system and work ing within it.
2t However, I wish to emphasi/e that social movements do not simply integrate the contenders into a system, they also produce some real change and generate sub-systems within which the actors operate and reproduce themselves. Instead of leading to a sudden revolutionary transformation. these movements often both coexist and compete with the dominant social arrangement. Unlike insurrectionist movements, they do not or cannot undo political authority, although this does not mean that they are integrated in the sense ol ideological and political eo-oplalion because the \ery operation ol the movement signifies considerable change for its members. Rather, in a sense, it conjures up (iramscian "passive revolution" (or a "war of position") which aims not simply at capturing state pov\ei (as the insurrectionists do in their "frontal attack") but focuses on the gradual capture anil possession of the society by exerting moral and intellectual leadership over civil institutions and processes.-1 A true revolution, tor Gramsei, is not [List winning the state powei but winning the society by institutional, intellectual, and moral hegemony. "A social group can, and indeed must, already exercise leadership before winning
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1Cl(i X governmental power (this indeed is one of the principal conditions tor the winning of such power)."
25 Although "passive revolution" represents a conscious strategy, its consequences reflect those of the social movements.
Whereas "frontal attacks" or insurrections are likely to occur in societies in which civil institutions are minimally available to mediate between the government and the people, passive revolution occurs where a strong civil society prevails. But the passive revolution, the "revolution of the spirit." is prolonged, "complex, difficult," and calls for "exceptional qualities of patience and inventive spirit."
2 ' 1 The reformist core of social movements and passiverévolution must be evident from both their "integrating" impacts and the conscious strategy ot the movements which give priority to changing the society rather than to capturing governmental power. This is radically distinguished trom the insurrectionary movements whose aim is frontal attack against the government (the war of maneuver), which results in a differeni outcome.
In this essay I argue that Iran experienced an insurrectionary movement aimed at capturing the state power; Egypt, on the other hand, developed with a degree of relative openness, a pervasive Islamic social movement which operated ami brought about significant changes within the civil society but tailed lo alter the political structure. In other words. Iran witnessed an Islamic revolution without a strong Islamic movement; but Egypt experienced a movement without a revolution. Three major factors were involved in this equation, differing political and social statuses of the clergy, differences in the ways that Islam was articulated and practiced, and finally different degrees of political control in the two countries. In the following pages I will elaborate on these two trajectories and their implications lor revolutionary and reformist outcomes. On February II, 1979. Tehran radio announced the victory of the Iranian revolution with feverish jubilation. This heralded the end of a 2.500-year-old monarchy. A mood of ecstasy overtook the populace who rushed into the streets en mass. Women milled through the crowd, handing out candies and \h(irh<n. sweet drinks. Vehicles sounded iheir horns in unison, beaming their lights as they drove down the main streets, which only days before had witnessed bloody clashes between the protesters and the army. These same streets were now being patrolled by the revolutionary militias, the Pasdaran. For those present, it was a day of incomparable victory.
The victory day was the culmination of over eighteen months of mass demonstrations, bloody confrontations, massive industrial actions, a general sinke, and many political maneuverings. Yet the genesis of the revolution niusi he traced io structural changes that had been underway since the 1930s, when the country began undergoing a process of moderni/ation. This process was accelerated especially after the coup 1953 engineered by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which toppled nationalist prime minister. Mohammad Mosaddeq, and reinstated the Shah. This structural change resulted in many conflicts, the chief among them being the contradiction between socioeconomic change and political underdevelopment. 27 In addition to these structural causes, certain accelerating factors-state inefficiency, corruption and a sense of injustice among many sectors of the Iranian society-were also involved.
The policy of moderni/ation and economic change, initiated by the state uiulei both Re/a Shah (1925-46) and his son. the late Shah, resulted in the gnmth of new social forces, a development that dismayed traditional social groups. By the late 1970s, a large and well-to-do modern middle class, modern youth, public women, an industrial working class, in addition to a new poor slum and squatter dwellers dominated the social scene. With the exception of the latter, all these groups represented the beneficiaries ol the economic development, who enjoyed relatively high status and comparable economic rewards. However, the persistence of the Shah's anachronistic autocrac) (political underdevelopment) prevented these thriving social layers from participating in the political process, something that angered them. At the \er\ same lime, the old social groups-a segment of the traditional ba-/aarcs. the old strata of the urban middle class, the clergy and (hose adherent to Islamic institutions-were also frustrated by the modernization strategy because it undermined their economic interests and social status.
When all the institutional channels that could have given expression to the discontent were closed, the populace became increasingly alienated from the state In the meantime, corruption, inefficiency, a sense ol injustice, and a feeling of moral outrage characten/ed the social psychology of many Iranians So. during the tense years of the 1970s, at the height of the Shah's authoritarian rule and remarkable economic development, many people (except perhaps the upper class and landed peasantry) seemed dissatisfied, albeit for different reasons But .ill were united in blaming the Shah and his western allies tor that state of affairs. It is not surprising, then, that the language of dissent and protests was largely anti-monarchy, anti-imperialist, third worldist. and even nationalist, turning towards the end to religious discourse
The opportunity for popular mobili/alion aimed \\ith what we used to call the "Cartel ite bree/e" (Mnvc;// <• I 'urti-ri degree of expression. This expression, in the process, was cumulatively built up and in I he course ot less than iwo years swept aside the monarchy. It ull began with a limited relaxation on censorship, allowing some literary and intellectual activities (in the (joelhe Institute and in the universities in Tehran) and public gatherings by political Islamists (in Oquba Mosque). It continued with the distribution, by the intellectuals and liberal politicians, of openly critical letters to high-level officials. In the midst of this, an insulting article in a daily paper, kttilaat. against Ayatollah Khomeini triggered a demonstration in the shrine city of Qum which left some demonstrators killed. To commemorate this death, a large-scale demonstration took place in the A/eri city of Tabri/ in the north. This marked the beginning of a chain of events which formed a nation-wide revolutionary protest movement in which diverse segments of the population, modern and traditional, religious und secular, men and women, massively participated and in which the 'ultima came to exert its leadership. But why did the clergy in particular lead the revolution?
I-or over twenty-five years of autocratic rule, since the 1953 coup, any effective secular political parties and non-governmental organi/ations had been removed or destroyed. The coup crushed both the nationalist and communist movements; trade unions were infiltrated by the secret police. SAVAK; publications were strictly censored; and there remained hardly any effective non-governmental organizations (N(iOs). 2x The primary source of organi/ed political dissent came from the underground guerrilla organi/ations. Marxist I-edaiun and radical Islamic Mujahedin, whose activities were limited to isolated armed operations. "' Student activism also remained restricted, limited either to campus politics inside the country or to events carried out by the Iranian students abroad. In short, the secular groupings, while badly dissatisfied, were disorganized and without leadership.
Unlike secular groups, however, the clergx had the comparative advantage of possessing invaluable institutional capacity, including its own hierarchical order, over H).(KX) mosques, Husseiniehs, Huw/ehs, and associations which acted as vital means of communication among the revolutionary contenders. Young Islamists, both girls and hoys along with young clergymen linked the institution of the 'ulama to the people. A hierarchical order facilitated unified decision making and a systematic flow of order and information; and in mosques higher-level decisions were disseminated to both the activists and the general public. In short, beyond the lack of a credible alternative, this institutional capacity and a remarkable ambiguity in the message of the clergy On ihr .mil ilriiiiH latic nature til tin-Shuh's lesjime anil its political implications, sec I n-il Halltda). li'iin: l)ifliilni\hii> mul Di'ii'/n/iini'iil (I omlon. IVnjiuin. l l >77) (on SAVAK activities); llahih l.aictatili. Ijihni I nin/i-, <nnl ;\iiim in, \ in ('ass, 1966 Re/a Shah, the father of Mohammad Re/a I'ahlasi. emerged during the conditions of remarkable political instability and social insecurity spread by years of upheavals, civil war. foreign occupation, and nomadic uprisingsconditions which breed the desire for "strong leaders." Brought to power by a British-engineered coup, he set out lo establish a strong state on the image ol the West and its third-world variant, the Turkish Republic headed by Kamal Alalurk. He aimed lo build a unified modern stale founded upon secular nationalism, educational development, anil state capitalism. ' ' Many of these measures seriously undermined the institutions of Islam and the 'ulania To begin with, the Judicial"), up to then under (he influence ol the clergy, was entirely restructured; modern educated lawyers replaced traditional judges; iTcnch Civil ('odes took the place of most Islamic laws, and the secular judges determined the nature of cases deemed to he raised in seeulai or nus courts Re/.i Shah, m addition, restricted religious festivals, com memorations. passion plays, and other practices that allecled public life. The establishment ot a modern system of taxation, along with that ol Ministry of A\\i/<if (hndowmenls). dcpmed the clergy of a si/able segment of religious tax income; and. with this, the economic independence which the ulama had eii|osed for the previous two centuries was threatened. Mut more important, educational letorni played a lasting pari in Re/a Shah's secular dreams. Setting up unified state-run schools meant thai traditional institutions of learning controlled by the clergy and a curriculum dominated by the teaching ol Oui an. grammar, rhetoric, and logic in nuikltih^ and ///</<//rsc//v lost their preeminence Thus, while students in both modern pnmars schools and colleges grew more than live-told between 1925-41.
(s the number of takihch\ (theological students) in madresehs fell Irom over 5,500 in 1929-30 to fewer than 1,340 in 1937. Indeed, es en the children ol many prominent 'ulamä prclcrrcd and moved into the modern administrative occupations. "' The social and intellectual impact of modern schooling was also far-reaching. With ils 1 Ain.ili \a.n. Iran between Twu Revolutions, 140.
emphasis on diversified subjects, it offered and facilitated alternative discourses, scientific rationality, and secular practices instead of religious paradigms. Moreover, modern schools, along with other public places such as parks, cinemas, cafes, factories, and offices, contributed to the movement of urban women from domestic seclusion into the public domain with men.' 7 Re/a Shah's relentless war against the veil was already under way. Notwithstanding his palriarchism, he forcefully outlawed the chudor. a long veil of a single piece, and required high officials to bring their wives to public events.
These measures, introduced in drastic and often brutal ways, undermined the clergy profoundly but neither eliminated them nor killed religious sentiments among people. The policies, however, did make accessible alternative secular ways of living, thinking, and reasoning, while offering diversified role models and sources of legitimacy. It is perhaps not surprising that after the Allies removed Re/a Shah and during an unprecedented democratic experience between 1941 and 1953, various sorts ot secular, nationalist, radical, and Marxist ideologies flourished. Islam as a faith, discourse, and mobili/ing force continued to decline. A few women who had been forced to unveil under Re/a Shah returned to wearing the traditional chador alter his fall; the remainder, along with the new generations of women, continued with their new identities.
lx Although the number of talabehs increased."> political Islam declined drastically. Linder Ayatollah Broujerdi, the miirjti 1 tnqlccil, the Haw/eh remained apolitical. When one segment of the 'ulumu together with ba/aares supported the nationali/ation of oil. the Ayatollah chose to remain neutral. In the end. the clergy's tear of the Tudeh Party's growth under Prime Minister Mosaddeq allied them with the 1953 coup which toppled the nationalist lead er. 40 There seems to be evidence to suggest a decline in religious practice among ordinary people. An eyewitness account during the Mosaddeq era reported about the mosques which had been emptied of the masses. 41 While it is likely that in general popular religious sentiments remained, new venues of popular expression nevertheless opened up in political parties, artistic circles, associations, trade unions, and (he like. Now millions of ordinary men and women joined or sympathized with movements which were known to be secular, radical, and Marxist. Mosaddeq. the secular leader of the struggle to " Interestingly, aller Ihc Islamic Revolution, the mayor ot Tehran. Karhaschi. was attacked by ionsei\ali\e student weekly. I'muni-i i\iini'\liiii. because he had made hundreds ot public parks .nul "u-en spots in the city wheic 1 The coup d'état of 1953. planned by the CIA. was designed to end the Premiership of Mohammad Mosaddeq and reinstate the authority of the Shah It thus ended the democratic experience, crushed both the secular nationalist and communist movements, and pushed political Islam on to the sidelines. It consolidated a regime that was to manifest a model ot moderm/ation in the peiiphery. The post-coup era. notably the 1960s and 1970s, represented a period of remarkable economic growth, integration in (he world market, urbam/ation. and social change-all initiated primarily by the autocratic state of the Shah, sale-guarded by a notorious secret police. SAVAK. This new phase of modernization enhanced many programs that Re/a Shah had initialed. It promoted the ascendancy of modern classes the professional-bureaucratic and technocratic intelligentsia, industrial working class, public women, and modern youth -at the cost of traditional social groups and ideals: the feudal class, ba/aanes. the 'ulama. and the institutions of Islam in general.
The post-coup regime became the closest ally of the United States in the region. It joined western military, political, and economic treaties to become a satellite ol the West. In a big push for moderni/alion. the Shah inaugurated in 1963 the "White Revolution" in which land reform, women enfranchisement, and the l.itcracv (Dips were the most important elements with far-reaching social consequences Land reform, in particular, curtailed the power of feudal lords, converted the peasantry into eithei small landowners or rural proletariat who then migrated to cities, developed commodity relations in the countryside, and expanded communications between villages and cities and within the countryside in general.
In the meantime, rising oil prices contributed to a remarkable annual growth rate of over I I percent tor the entire 1963 72 period, a rate that jumped again to a staggering 30 percent during 1974 and 1975 Parallel to these developments, other traditional social groups were losing ground. The feudal class, among them many important members of the clergy, had virtually withered away. Its members gradually moved into commerce, speculation, and industry. A large segment of the ba/aar, well over 5(X),(MX) retail and wholesalers, felt the impact of the invasion of modern financial institutions, trade companies, shopping centers, large factories, and new tastes.
4S While some surely resisted the invasion, others lost the battle, and still many more began to conform to the reality of modernization by trading foreign goods, employing modern trade relations and language. 4l) By the eve of the Revolution, the Ba/aar was sociologically, if not politically, divided.
s " The political divide came only after the revolution manifesting along the lines of Banisadr. who was supported by the more modernist and well-off ba/aaries, and the clergy backed by the more traditional-minded and small scale traders.
More than anybody, the clergy was on the defensive on the economic, political and social fronts. In economic terms, land reform, together with the establishment in 1963 of the Organi/ation of Endowment cut back the main source of clergy's income from Awc/af. Earlier. Re/a Shah's administrative This (rend surely represented a significant shift in the sociali/ation and politicization of Islam. However, this and its contemporary religiosity were far Irom a mass social movement and bore little resemblance to the Egyptian or Algerian versions in the early 1990s. In Iran, the Maktab-i Tashayo and similar activities remained weak, isolated, and elitist Only three issues ot' their two periodicals were published. As historian Re/a Afshari points out. Ayatollah Khomeini's most significant contributions to the Islamic ideology. \'flu\(ii-e f-di/ih. was unknown to some ot' his most ardent followers.^ Contrary to the prevailing assumption, there is not adequate evidence suggesting that the 'ulanui resorted to making an appeal to the masses. 57 Indeed, none of the major leaders paid a particular attention to the musta/'afm as a special class. One should also be cautious about the success of the Islamic schools in spreading religious messages or, for that matter, political Islam. In my own three-year experience in one of them in the 1960s, the Islamic programs were the least attractive to most students, 70 and the clerical instructors the least popular with the many of us who, in the end, felt the pressure of institutional indoctrination and left the school for secular counterparts. The somber mood of the Islamic entertainment could hardly compete with the non-religious fun which the students actively sought. On the other hand, there is a widespread assumption that the nmxtaz'afin, the poor, knew the mullas and joined the revolution through such Islamic institutions as hey'ats, the ethnic-based and ad-hoc religious setups. Contrary to what is claimed, 71 while they did bring together many shi'i poor, the hey'ats were hardly the sites of political mobilization. My own direct observations confirm a young squatter's view that the functions of the hey'ats remained limited to "socializing," "sacrificing Imam Hussein and weeping [for his dead body]." 72 The urban poor went under the political banner of the 'ulama only just before the insurrection of February I979. 71 In short, the significance of religious publications and institutions for political Islam lay not much in their ideological impact during the 1960s and the 1970s but in their networking capacity and mobilizing role on the eve of the revolution.
More important, taking these as a sole indication of Islamic revival, especially when they are seen in retrospect, downplays a significant parallel phenomenon, that is, a strong secular tendency that was developing at the very same lime, a subject almost totally overlooked by the post-revolutionary scholarship. Above, I pointed to the historical bases of secular behavior in Iran: widespread modern education, the expansion of communication, and the erosion of economic and social position of the clergy. The trend reached its peak in the very decade in which the Islamic revolution occurred. Unlike the 1940s, when communist, nationalist, and intellectual movements manifested in the major secular institutions, the Shah's dictatorship in the 1970s largely deprived the society of comparable institutions Instead, there was a tremendous boost in the production and consumption of secular journals, cinemas, western movies, pop music cassettes, popular singers, youth centers (klmne-ye Javanan), bars promoting alcohol drinks, Caspian Sea holidays, and the vast popularity of western-produced television programs. 74 The number of movie viewers increased by over 50 percent between 1969 and 1975. nearly twice as much as that of urban population growth in the same period. During the 1970s, over 500 foreign films a year, one-fourth American, were shown in the Iranian cinemas.
Beyond that, by 1975 about 50 percent of urban families had acquired television sets, compared to less than 4 percent in I960. with about 65 percent of total households owning radio sets. 7S This media succeeded by the late 1970 in shaping a highly secular popular culture embodied in the songs and performances ot do/ens of popular singers and actors, such as Ciougoush. Fardin, Aghasi, and Sousan. These were at a time when cinema, radio, and television were condemned by religious-minded people, since in Ayatollah Khomeini's views, these media were being "used to corrupt our youth."
7<1
It was such a background that rendered Islamic leaders skeptical about any political change. Although many scholars writing alter the revolution magnitied the extent of an Islamic movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Shariati's letter to his son (in the late 1960s) shows how he was frustrated, pessimistic, and bitter with the people who had remained disinterested in his mission. 77 Even Ayatollah Khomeini in 1970 thought that it might take two centuries to overthrow the Iranian monarchy. 7 "
Indeed, the popularity of Ali Shariati, a modernist Islamic intellectual, during the mid-1970s seemed to begin an Islamic movement, although it remained limited to political discourse among Muslim intelligentsia and hardly assumed any institutional form within the civil society, whether in associations, NGOs, syndicates, schools, neighborhoods, workplaces or media, in contrast to Egypt during the early 1990s. Although the Mujahedin-c Khalq Organi/ation was influenced by Shariati's ideas, it did not receive ,i mass following until after the revolution.
7 '' The Islamic movement in pre-revolution 74 It is important lo note thai, unlike attending mosaics, shnncs 01 ln\'di\. these were commodities for which ordinary and middle income people had to pa\ I exclude those leisure items which only the rich could altoid to consume, such .is uibaicts. I mope.in holidays (as opposed lo allendm)! Ha||l " On these iifiures see UNKSCO. Iran proved, in short, to be a late starter. There remained no time tor political Islam to evolve into a mass social movement. In Iran, an Islamic movement was in the making when it was interrupted by an Islamic Revolution.
INI EGYPTIAN ISLAMIST MOVEMENT
Unlike Iran, however, Egypt developed a strong and pervasive Islamist movement by the early 1990s. The popular image of the Islamist Movement in Egypt is represented in the protracted war of attrition between the militant Islamists, notably members of the Jihad and al-Jama'u al-Islamiya, and the slate, beginning since the assassination of President Sadat in September 1981. It was also manifested in attacking Christian Copts, western tourists, secular Muslim thinkers, and the image of Shaikh Omar Abdur-Rahman, the spiritual leader of al-Jama'u al-Islamiya, who was detained in the United States for his alleged involvement in the bombing of the World Trade Center. Indeed, during 1993 alone, the confrontations between these Islamists and the government forces left 1,106 killed or wounded, and 17,191 arrested. 80 Several attempts were made to kill politicians, security heads, and public figures. In addition, a number of cinemas, cafes, video shops. Nile cruisers, and banks also became the target of bombing campaigns. Despite its dramatic appearance, this militant trend was by far less influential and pervasive than the gradualist and nonviolent trend. The more significant was the growth of religiosity in general, which further fed the spread of political Islam within the civil institutions.
Islamist revival in Egypt expanded from below through a pervasive social movement which began in the 1920s but spread rapidly after the early 1970s, reaching its peak in the early 1990s. It manifested itself in a vast spectrum of groups, encompassing, on one end the violent militants, the non-violent and gradualist Islamic coalition (EI-Ekhwan and Hi/.bul'Amal), and the individualist sufi orders. At the other end, it also included Al-A/har and a number of institutions of the secular state, including the Ministry of Awqaf and the Supreme Islamic Council. The 1980s experienced a dramatic increase in the number of ahli, or private mosques. Officials reported that the number of nongovernmental mosques had increased sharply from 40,000 in 1981 to 70,000 in I ( W). SI Many of these mosques served as places for alternative and often dissenting religious messages. Over 4,000 Islamic associations existed in the early 1990s, also a rise of over 100 percent since 1975. The period saw a spectacular popularity in the production and sale of Islamic books, pamphlets, and religious cassettes. In 1994, over one quarter of books published were religious, a 25 percent rise since 1985. during the 1995 Cairo book fair were Islamic.* 1 The tapes of figures such as Shaikh Kishk, numbering over a thousand, were on sale in their millions. Dozens of Islamic newspapers, weeklies, and monthlies had high circulation rates. 1 * 4 Radio Quran, a channel devoted entirely to religious matters, maintained its highest popularity in this period, while in contrast, movie viewers and production of domestic films declined.
K<i Self-censorship emerged in the production of television programs in response to pressure on the state by popular sentiment, and religious programs increased by 50 percent between 1975 and 1990 X6 island sentiment was particularly expressed in a marked decline of alcohol consumption, bars, liquor stores, and night clubs for Egyptians At the same time. Islamic activism in the last two decades penetrated a variety of civil institutions, mass media, formal education, and community social services. By the early 1990s, the Muslim Brotherhood was able to control Egypt's major professional syndicates-doctors, engineers, pharmacists, lawyers, dentists, commerce, college professors, its well as the student unions. In general, the 4,(XM) Islamic NGOs outdid the 9,000 secular ones. They were widely believed to be financed, managed, and to function better than others."
7 The Muslim Brothers were also involved in creating Islamic investment companies in the early 1980s until the government cracked down on them. With returns as high as 20 percent return, the companies were considered by many to subsidi/e the low-income groups in society. In addition to civil activism, the Islamic coalition (of Muslim Brotherhood with the Labour Party) made considerable headway in the local and national elections. As a mass movement, support for the Muslim Brothers came from diverse social groups, ranging from segments of the business community to lower classes, with old, young, male and female members. Yet its backbone originated from members of the modern middle class. On the other hand, activists of the militant groups were mostly young men (between 20 and 30 years) with rural or provincial background, primarily educated, many with college degixvs, or professionals, who resided in Cairo's lower class neighborhoods or large villages of Middle Egypt. The early 1900s witnessed entry of younger (average age 21 ) and less-educated members (only 30 percent being university educated, compared to 64 percent in the 1970s) into the ranks of the militants.
8 '' Lower-middle-class youth appeared to be new players in radical Islannsiii. Although organi/.ed labor remained in general out of Islamists' reach, the relationship between the urban poor and Islamists is complex. I will suggest below that, contrary to common perception, Islamic social welfare organizations were not places for Islamists political activism. On the other hand, it is true that while many radical activists in Greater Cairo, for instance, come from or reside in slums or shanty towns, this in itself does not necessarily point to their political presence among the poor. High rent and visibility are sufficient reasons for a militant to dwell in a cheaper and a hide-out locality.'"' In fact, a pervasive housing crisis has made a spatially "marginali/cd" middle class a peculiar Egyptian urban phenomenon. Although the episodes of Cairo earthquakes in 1992 and Hooding in upper Egypt in 1994 pointed to the Islamists' attempt to build a social basis among the poor, these were largely occasional activities.
Political Islam in Egypt in this period reflected primarily the rebellion of the impoverished middle class who were frustrated by a feeling of moral outrage.'" Their high expectations, an outcome of their high education and thus social status, were dampened in the job market, which offered few prospects for economic success A product of Nasser's welfare-state boom, this segment represented the losers ol Sadat's influih policy-one which opened the country to western economic, political, and cultural influence, as well as a rapprochement with the Jewish enemy. Islamism in Egypt represented an ideological package which negated all the perceived causes of such a state of deprivation-economic dependency, cultural sell-out, and national humiliation (1967 defeat by the Israelis and then Camp David Accord). In view of all the failed ideologies, chiefly Nasseritc socialism and Sadat's capitalism, and of the conditions of western cultural, political, and economic onslaught. Islam, was seen as the only indigenous doctrine that could bring about a genuine change.
Such an articulated ideology in political Islam belonged clearly to the core, the cadres and activists. Beyond those, there were many others in the outer concentric circles of the movement, such as the lower-class elements, who found in Islamism not the leaders' ideologies but, largely in pragmatic terms, the only viable opposition to the status quo. These fringe groups, "free riders," often articulated no coherent ideology of their own, nor did they even internali/e that of the leadership. Indeed, they would have turned to almost any social force which offered them a way out of their impasse and the prospect of a dignified future. Similar strata had followed the Wafd in the 1920s and I9.NK. then Nasser in the 1950s and the 1960s. Moth were secular to the bone but offered credible alternatives.
1 '-1
I'OI ITICAI. VI KSI S SOCIAL ISLAM
Why did Islamist activism in Egypt assume a social movement character, whereas in Iran it was narrowly politici/ed 1 .' It is often noted that shi'ism is a tradition which, unlike its Stinni counterpart, mixes religion with politics and, as an oppressed sect, constitutes an inherently revolutionary tradition. The Shi'i and Sunni branches of Islam surely take different approaches to the issue of rule, or hukiiniyytt. Yet both regard Islam as politics; and, as Zubaida and Keddie note, there is nothing inherently revolutionary about shi'ism's character. In Sunnism. the community determines political authority. In Shi'ism, however, only the imams have the legitimacy to rule the umma. In reality, this transpired in the time of shi'i imams. After the occultation of the last, twelfth. imam, the issue remained in controversy for over a century until the Qajar period in Iran, when shi'i scholars were divided into the two schools, the akhbari and usuli. The former stressed the literal following of the Prophet's traditions; the latter recogni/ed the concept of ijtihad, which granted power to the 'ulama to interpret (he Prophet's sunna and stipulate new injunctions if deemed necessary. Although the clergy gained an unprecedented prominence, they were not yet entitled to exercise full authority on behalf of the imams. As such. Ayatollah Khomeini's concept of Hokommit-c Islanii (Islamic Government), written in 1971, represents simply a new invention in the shi'i tradi-''-' I am grateful ID Professor Suad hilclin Ibrahim lor bringing these historical notes ID my attention.
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lion'"; and its invocation alter the revolution was largely the result of political circumstances at the time which ensured the clergy's leadership. 1 ' 4 Yet, as Alghar and Keddie among others have noted, certain historical and institutional specificities in shi'i Islam contributed to the political versus social character of Islamist activism in Iran.
In both Iran and Egypt, the clergy constitute a distinct status group who despite internal differentiation (along seniority position and economic status) share common interests in terms of the security of income and social and spiritual legitimacy. But their political and social positions in the two countries differed. Unlike in Iran, where religious affairs were the exclusive prerogative of traditionalist Shi-i clergy, who became opposition leaders, in Egypt the administration of religious affairs was extended to lay activists who spread their message through massive associational work within civil society. In the eighteenth century, the 'ulamfi of Egypt were an integral part of the ruling clue anil acted as a medium between the elites and the people. By the time Mohammed Ali consolidated his power, the r ulama had become a formidable power which the Egyptian leader could not afford to ignore. He first bought off then support by offering them income from farm tax and endowments and a prerogative of consultation on political matters, then later subordinated them by denying them those privileges and making them paid employees of the state. The 'ulama, nevertheless, remained a significant component of the anti-colonial movement.' )S Opposition of 'ulama to British rule continued most notably with the activities of AI-Afghani and Mohammed Abdu, and later Kashid Reda. As Islamic reformers, they struggled not only against foreign domination hut also attempted to reformulate Islam to rival with the western progress a measure that some modernist 'ulama in Iran began as late as the I%(K.
As a component of the state, however, the political role of the 'ularna remained limited only to nationalist postures. On domestic matters, except for some clerical figures, they remained by and large complacent. 'Ulamâ's dependence on (he slate was further intensified by Nasser, who in 1955 abol- ished religious courts, put all endowments under state control, and then took over AI-A/,har and Islamic education in 1961. Despite a similar move in Iran in the 1960s, which seriously curtailed the clergy's control over shrines and mawqufat, they nevertheless maintained their autonomy by relying on themselves (many of them were landowners), on ba/aaris with which they had close ties, and on small voluntary religious donations.'"' Thus in Egypt, it was not the 'ulamâ but the lay Islamic activists who took the banner of opposing internal rulers. Hence, the emergence of the Society of Muslim Brothers (MB) in 1928 during Egypt's liberal era . when the secular-nationalist Wafdist Party and the Royal family ruled the country. The MB was founded by Hassan El-Banna, a school teacher from Ismailiya who was dismayed by the imperialist economic domination of his country; corruption and degradation of Muslims, especially those in the younger generation; and the decadence of (he kings. His messages found appeal among a vast array of Egyptian citi/.ens who came to believe that theirs was a society of Jahiliya. The Brotherhood grew rapidly from having only four branches m 1929 to 2,000 branches in 1949, with about one million activists and sympa thi/.ers at its peak. The activists came from various walks of life, but the core originated from the rising urban middle classes who felt the crunch of "foreign economic control which limited the prospects for the new bourgeoisie. '"' 7 Hassan El-Banna was assassinated by police in 1949 and was replaced by Hassan el-Hudayhi as the spiritual guide.
Despite its close connection with the Free Officers, the MB went through a series of suppressions after the 1952 Revolution by Nasser, a nationalist leader committed to modernism, secularism, nationalism, and later lo socialist ideas.'"* Such MB figures as Sayyed Qutb, a major ideologue, were sent to jail and executed; and the State outlawed the organi/ation. After Nasser, a split has divided the movement between the revolutionary views like those of Sayyed Qutb and the gradualist views of Hassan al-Hudaybi. Both sides agreed that Egyptian society and polity was one of Jahili. which was characterized by the worship of man by man, and the sovereignty of man over man. While both strived for an alternative Islamic state and society, they differed on the ways to achieve such order. Sayyed Qutb advocated action and movement, regarding non-actives as non-Muslims. Hudaybi, on the other hand, called lor discourse, preaching and Jd'wa for the Islamic cause. Both wings shared an opposition to Zionism, crusaders, communism, secularism, and Nasserism. This schism was to mark the origin of (he split between today's militant and '"' On clergy-ba/.aar relations, sec Ahmad Ashral. "Ha/aar Mosque Alliance: I he Social Roots ot Revolts anil Revolutions." in I'ulitit v ('iiliiin', the reformist Islamic coalition (with Muslim Brothers). From the revolutionary trend emerged al-Takfir wal-Hejra, Jama'at Islamiya (both crushed during Sadat). al-Jihad, and al-Jama'a al-Islamiya (active to date).
The Muslim Brothers owed much of their success to their associational character-their commitment to social mobilisation within the civil society through organi/ing cells, alternative mosques, schools, youth associations, women's organi/ations, clinics, work cooperatives, as well as athletics and paramilitary groups. This strategy solidified the grass-roots basis of the MB, turning it into a mass social movement that spread Islamic sentiments in the society, integrating them into people's everyday li\cs.
In turn, the spread of Islamic sentiments (aided by both the failure of the liberal experiment and the mistrust of secular liberalism which in the 1940s was associated with colonialism) pushed the Egyptian secularists to give way to Islam.
100 As Lapidus notes, in this period, the secular intelligentsia "accepted an Islamic framework, and attempted to compromise between Islam and modernity. The net effect was not so much to rescue secularism as to legitimize the Muslim revival."
101 Yet it was a peculiar kind of revivalism, in that the fusion of Islamic symbols into the people's everyday life contributed to the production of a somewhat seculari/ed religion.
Whereas the secularization of religious symbols has been a feature of the Iskini of Egypt, Iran, on the contrary, has held religion and its symbols in an exalted position, emphasi/ing the sacred and esoteric nature of Islam. The Iranian, for example, would treat the Qur'an with great deference, placing it in assigned holy locations, where it rests in that protected place until it is taken out to be read on a special occasion. In Egypt, on the other hand, it is not uncommon to see a taxi driver switching between playing Egyptian pop music and reciting the holy book. In contrast to Egypt, where religious occasions are by and large popular festivals (ciilx), they are seen by an Iranian Muslim as sober, sad. and serious affairs, often associated with death and mourning. The playful and highly festive mood of the Egyptian Ramadan is comparable only to the Iranian Nowrooz (new year festivities). Islamic pop music is a common feature in Egypt's cultural and religious landscape, where popular singers perform songs about the Prophet Mohammed accompanied by a full backup band with synthesi/er and electric guitar. It would be, however, unthinkable for an Iranian Muslim to imagine Gougoush singing about Imam Hussein. In short, in contrast to Iran, where modernity and religion and the mundane and sacred were treated as mutually exclusive, Egypt experienced some kind of cultural hyhridity in which religion remained by and large dominant.
102 Consequently, binary oppositional identities of religious and traditional versus the secular and modern identities were by tar more pronounced in the Iran of the 1970s than the Egypt of the 1980s and 1990s. Like Turkey today and unlike Egypt, Iranian society was deeply divided along secular and religious lines. The implications of these different forms of religious practices vis-a-vis the social and political status of the clergy in the two countries were highly significant. The 'ulama in Iran were frustrated by the overall cultural change, rapid westernization, and secular behavior, which during the 1950s and 1960s threatened their social and cultural legitimacy. Modern educated youth particularly began to dismiss the clergy and the institution of religion in general. The source of this evil was perceived by the 'ulamâ as the corrupt regime and its western allies. These conditions then turned the 'ularna to oppositional politics which targeted (he state The experience of clergy in Egypt, however, was different. Despite the rise of modern ideas and social groups (such as the middle classes, educated youth and public women). AI-A/har (and nonclerical Islam) still enjoyed a great deal of respect and legitimacy among Egyptian Muslims; and despite the upsurge of political Islam. AI-A/har continues to represent religious orthodoxy in the country. Friday sermons of AI-A/har are well attended: its publications have mass circulation: and millions of people are still attracted to Sheikh Shu rawi's television lectures (klu>tal>ii\). Today, young modern Egyptians do not shy away from embracing traditional Islam. As someone who had observed the religious laxity of Iranian youth during the early 1970s. I was astonished by me extent of religiosity of the westerni/ed middle-and upper-class Egyptian youths who spoke with reverence about Islamic precepts and the clergy's authority. Consequently, not only had different segments of Egyptian society-the youth, the traditionalists, the 'ulama. and the state -found something to cherish about their Islam, the clergy did not experience as much frustration, resentment, and political dissent as their Iranian counterparts. They continued to maintain a great deal of social constituency and religious legitimacy. 101 Nevertheless, similar to the political Islamists, the 'ulama also remained committed to Islami/ing the society, albeit not by sei/ing political power, but by ilii'wu.
" pl In F.gypl. one can notice this in the day-lo dav bchavioi ot upper or up|>ei middle-class families. While young people gel m.imeil in lainv hotels like Mernolt or Hilton. I have nul observed alcohol being served on such occasions Young girls and hovs from wcsierm/ed classes mostly last during the Ramadan, many régulai I) piav and shout respect lor Islam and the clergy. In contrast, in Iran ol the late IWiOs and 1970s, modern classes in general expressed .1 gieal laxity in observing religion "" It is only very recently, in January IW7. that a group ot clergy tunned a group. The I'lenia Front, distinct from the official AI A/hat, in response tu the government's encroachment on their prerogatives, which included icijuests loi permission lu pre,ich m the mosques and to bring private mosques under the control ol the Ministry of Awqaf See AI HUMII (January 25. I9°7). 7.
Thus, strategically, two different approaches to Islamic change differentiated Iran and Egypt. The Iranian experience conjures up Gramsci's "frontal attack" or insurrectionary mode, whereas Egyptian Islamists pursued "passive revolution" with reformist consequences. Hardly familiar with Antonio Gramsci, Hasan El-Banna echoed this strategy many years ago:
Our duly as Muslim Brothers is ID work lor the reform of our selves, of our hearts and souls, by connecting them to ( iod the all-high; then to orgam/e our society so that it becomes a virtuous community winch calls lor the good and forbids evil-doing, then from the community will arise the good state.
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Mustafa Mashur. the present Ekhwan's leader points to the same approach: "All we ask is an Islamic state based on shuri'u ... It may take us a century to establish an Islamic slate. Our principles should be bequeathed to future generations and there should be no deviation from these principles."
105 In a recent encounter in a Cairo mosque, a militant young man accused the shaikh ol political complicity. The shaikh, a young man wearing a suit and necktie, responded that the task was not a matter of anti-government political agitation but "building an ideological infrastructure" and creating a truly Muslim society at the base.
10 '
1
The Muslim Brothers had begun to put their passive revolution, to build that ideological mlrastructure into practice years earlier through extensive networks and grass-roots structures. Not only did these networks spread Islamic sentiments, they concomitantly served to fulfill some fundamental material and spiritual needs of the ordinary Egyptians. By doing so, the movement unintentionally provided conditions lor a "negative integration" of its constituency, since those networks and activities devised coping mechanisms and a moral community in which many contenders felt at home. Guilian Denoeux's argument that reformist outcomes occur only when the leaderships in such institutions adopt conciliatory strategy is partly true, but it disregards the objective (reformist) impact these networks olten have over the perception of the constituency and the dynamics of the movements '°7 In Egypt. Islamic associations played a crucial institutional role in this process of both integration and change.
In the last two decades, the shortcomings of the traditional top-down planning and implementing development objectives in Egypt boosted the expansion of the local and small-scale development projects, especially the NGOs. Islamic associations, often centered in ahli mosques, were quick to utili/e the opportunity and grew extensively. They accounted for one third of the total private voluntary organizations (PVOs) in the late I98()s, lox and at least 50 percent of all welfare associations, or 5,000 PVOs in the early 1990s, offering charity and health services to millions of Egyptian poor.
l(|1 ' Indeed, it appeared that the mosques came to provide alternative support services to the lowincome to compensate for the government's withdrawal from its social provisions after more liberal economic policies. As a typical association, the Islamic CDA in Ezbat Zein in Cairo, for example, offered classes on the Qur'an but also provided a sewing center, day care, medical treatment, remedial tutoring, a food cooperative, and septic tank cleaning.' 10 Others offered video clubs, computer training centers, and other services to cater for (he needs of such groups as the high school graduates who are the potential recruits of the radical political Islamists. The availability of both funding (in the form of zakat from businesses and migrant workers in the Persian Gulf) and the spirit of voluntarism (scarce in today's Egypt) rendered these associations comparatively advantageous. 111 The government supported the initiative only to the extent that this sector shouldered a portion of the government's burden of providing social services.
What made these practices Islamic was the combination of an alternative to both the state and the private sector, the religious conviction of some of their activists, zakat funding, and especially the provision of affordable social services. Yet for many involved in them, these associations simply provided a job or, for some, even a business. Contrary to the common perception, Islamic social welfare organizations were not places where Islamists conducted political mobilization, but simply acted as service organizations. The vast majority of these NGOs had no link to political Islam. Only a few were related to Muslim Brothers and only a handful to the radical Islamists.
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However, unlike the Islamic associations, the Islamic-dominated proles sional syndicates were all allied with the Muslim Brotherhood. The Ekhwan managed by the early 1990s to control the major professional syndicates and, in others, to constitute a formidable opposition. The influence of the Islamists meanwhile caused a dramatic increase in membership of many unions such as the Teachers Union, which grew from 250,000 in 1985 to 750,000 by 1992.' '
The popularity of these syndicates had largely to do with the performance of the Islamist leaderships: They fought corruption, increased members' income, created systems of social welfare, found jobs for unemployed members, set up consumer cooperatives, established sub-syndicates and social clubs, and did a great deal of political mobilization. ' ' 4 An exemplary activity was their rapid mobili/ation during the Cairo earthquakes in 1992 and flooding in upper Egypt in 1994. The syndicales became so powerful and vocal that the government saw no choice but to curtail them by both legal means and the arrest of their leading members.
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In providing social services, the Muslim Brothers were not alone. Indeed, their grass-roots activities compelled other social forces to enter into the competition, hoping to share the political space. Al-A/har. for instance, began to oiler similar grass mois social services as oppositionell Islamists.
116 In addition, the Egyptian government's measures to upgrade slums and squatter areas in the early 1990s clearly reflected the incident of Imbaba, a slum area in Cairo, in 1991, when militant Islamists had created, according to foreign media, "a state within the state." Similarly, secular groups, in particular secular NCiOs seemed to work hard to offer their own piecemeal alternatives. An estimated five million poor benefited from the health, educational, financial. and community services of Egyptian PVOs in 1990.' l7 As in many other similar experiences, the net result of such an intense competition was both to mohili/e the critical mass and to provide a coping mechanism of a political, economic, and spiritual nature.
Beyond improving material conditions, the Islamist movement in Egypt also ottered alienated constituencies with an alternative social, cultural, and moral community within which the rival secular and western culture seemed less threatening. F-'acing the conditions of rapid globali/ation and western cultural penetration, these communities provided the traditionalists both with an expression of discontent and a moral safety net. The ritual of weekly gatherings that spread across the small and big cities reflected not only a cultural protest but also materiah/ed a Durkheimian social solidarity, security, and moral integration-the contradictory conditions to which Arlene MacLeod referred when she called the new veiling among Cairian women a way of "accommodating protest." 1 IS The Young Men's Muslim Association, with its over 2.000 members just in Tanta, for instance, offered youth libraries, sport facilities, language and computer classes, video and television sessions. lectures, tours, and holidays.' |l) In hundreds of urban neighborhood gatherings (hciliiqat), women from diverse socioeconomic backgrounds grouped together weekly not only to learn about Islamic precepts but also to gain a sense of belonging to a moral community. In another domain. Islamic-dominated syndicates became the places where members, mostly excluded from national political processes, could really participate in decision making and he confident that their votes be counted. The syndicates were the site of the struggle for human rights, where issues like political prisoners and the Palestinian cause could be discussed; activists could collect donations for the victims of Bosnia. Iraq, and Chechnia 120 ; and Hajj pilgrimages could be organi/ed for members. Even young adults could stay away from opulent Egyptian hotel marriage ceremonies by organi/.ing "Islamic weddings."
The growing number of Islamic private schools accounted for the development of yet another institution of both religious dissent and integration. In addition to a decent education (Ki'lim) which, the Muslims believed could not he obtained from a feeble and "morally misguided" national education system. these schools sociali/ed their pupils into morality and the virtues of Islam (Uirl>i\\(i) . Different from the A/hari institutions, these new institutions were not dissimilar to my own Islamic school in Tehran back in the late 1960s. where the daily collective prayers, religious classes, camps, and alternative leisure defined its Islamic identity but on a scale that was much larger in Kgypt than in Iran.
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In short, during the 1990s, contestation in Egypt at the level of culture and moral virtues became even more fierce (perhaps because it was less cosily) than that in the provision of material welfare. There, "true Islam." both in idea and in deed, became the subject of an intense competition between various contenders, including the seculars, the net result being further concessions by secularists and the spread of Islamic ideas. This included not only variants of political Islam but also the modernists (tor example. Mustafa Mahmoud) as well as the secular slate which had already made significant concessions to Islamist revivalism. State-controlled television cut back many of the "immoral" shows and increased Islamic programming alter the early 1980s. In the same period, the government nutionuli/.cd many mosques, hiring thousands of shaikhs to offer sermons during the month of Ramadan. The number of Imams who worked for the Ministry of Awqal increased more than three-fold, from 6.000 in 1982 to 22,000 by 1996. In the same period, the number of groups memorising the Qur'an jumped from 900 to about 1,200.'--In 1993 '--EI-LiMv El-Islam (Dtccmber 5. IW6). 14.
to the politicians hut also the Islamic opposition-u phenomenon totally absent trom the Iranian political scene prior to the Islamic Revolution. It is important to note that these debates and expressions owed much to a relative political openness in the Egypt society. The space available in Egypt for the political parlies, press, and NGOs in the 1980s, however limited, was unparalleled to that under the Shah in Iran during the 1970s. During the 1980s. Egypt, unlike Iran, enjoyed a multi-party political system with nine parties, periodic elections, opposition newspapers, popular criticism of the government (unthinkable in some Arab states), and-most important-a judiciary that maintained its independence from the political authorities. But competition and controversy within the Islamist movement was also important in another respect. They implied a relative clarity on political views, a diversity of positions, internal dissent, and thus disunity-things which character!/c a social movement and are anomalous to a revolutionary scenario. Revolutions, unlike social movements, rest on high degree of unity, generality, and ambiguity. Unlike in Egypt, these elements were clearly present in Iran. The autocracy of the Shah, the sole leadership of the clergy resulting from the Shi'i clergy's hierarchical structure, lack of time for debate and dissent, and thus a remarkable ambiguity in the discourse of the revolution provided that astonishing unity.
12 '* In the meantime, the perseverance of both the Islamists and the state in Egypt created a political equilibrium in which neither party was ensured of a total victory. The Islamic Revolution m Iran, just like the socialist Revolution in Russia, surely bolstered similar movements in other parts of the world. Yet its very victory, in a sense, prevented similar scenarios in other countries, principally because it made incumbent states more vigilant while carrying out some reforms. Thus, not only did the Egyptian political regime remain intact, but it began by the mid-1990s to intensify pressure on even moderate Islamists. The emergency law barring public assembly was maintained. In 1992, a new Anti-Terrorism Law made preventive detention legal and restricted the opposition press. In 1993, the government used Law 100 to limit the success of Islamic candidates by interfering with the election procedures of the syndicates. Similar policies were used in the universities to restrict the election of Islamists to leadership positions. The Ministry of Awqal screened and mon-I2> ' Ot course, unity can he built by politic.il coalitions, but this requires an hegemonic element Ki enforce consensus on other dissenting paities I Ins was lacking in ligypt An indignant and well-orgam/ed clergy might have played lhat role as in Iran; hul in l-.gypl, the 'ulamä were nol in political opposition Nevertheless, it the situation changes, the Al A/har and Us 'ulunia are likely to join the bandwagon, even becoming major actors in an Islamic order. Indeed, even today there are signs that this slate institution may be used by militant young mushms. Egyptians and foreigners alike, «ho acquire Islamic knowledge while maintaining a critical stand against conciliatory politics of the AI A/har tiniest in the AI-A/ahai University during October IW5 when many sludenls protested the govern mem anesis and nnliiaiy iriaK of Muslim Bioihers point to the political potential of tins institution l-or details, see .M Aliniin Hi rA/i and Ai/idiili dining ihe last two weeks ol October and the first week of Novemhei IW> itored Islamic preachers. Those without the ministry's permit were not allowed to operate. ' '° Finally, the state accelerated its policy of taking over ahli mosques to the point where the Ministry of Awqaf was claiming to nationalize an average of 9,(X)() mosques a year.
1 " This pressure further exacerbated controversies and rifts within the movement. Internal division within the Ekhwan led to a split in 1996 from which Hizb El-Wasat emerged. While pleased with the divisions, the government refused to recognize the splinter group. Notwithstanding these developments, Islamic reforms from below continued unheeded. Egypt in the early 1990s was undergoing such an Islamic social change which was so significant that would have been unthinkable for the Iranian clergy under the Shah. Egypt, thus, experienced the persistence of an Islamic movement without an Islamic revolution, whereas, Iran underwent a revolution without a strong Islamic movement. By the mid-l9yOs, it looked as it Iran had begun to experience a "post-Islamist" phase," 2 a return from revolutionary ideology, the Egyptian Islamist movement was in the grip of three major challenges: an increase in hostility from the state; an acceleration of economic, political, and cultural globalization, and the revelation of what Oliver Roy termed the "failure of political Islam." 1 ' ' This was not good news for Egypt's Islamists
